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Abstract—Wireless power transfer (WPT) technology enables a cost-effective and sustainable energy supply in wireless networks.
However, the broadcast nature of wireless signals makes them non-excludable public goods, which leads to potential free-riders among
energy receivers. In this study, we formulate the wireless power provision problem as a public goods provision problem, aiming to
maximize the social welfare of a system of an energy transmitter (ET) and all the energy users (EUs), while considering their private
information and self-interested behaviors. We propose a two-phase all-or-none scheme involving a low-complexity Power And Taxation
(PAT) mechanism, which ensures voluntary participation, truthfulness, budget balance, and social optimality at every Nash equilibrium
(NE). We propose a distributed PAT (D-PAT) algorithm to reach an NE, and prove its convergence by connecting the structure of NEs
and that of the optimal solution to a related optimization problem. We further extend the analysis to a multi-channel system, which
brings a further challenge due to the non-strict concavity of the agents’ payoffs. We propose a Multi-Channel PAT (M-PAT) mechanism
and a distributed M-PAT (D-MPAT) algorithm to address the challenge. Simulation results show that, our design is most beneficial when
there are more EUs with more homogeneous channel gains.
Index Terms—Wireless Power Transfer, Public Good, Network Economics, Mechanism Design, Game Theory, Lindahl Allocation.
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1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation
W IRELESS power transfer (WPT) technology has been de-veloping rapidly and has emerged as a promising solution
to supply energy to low-power wireless devices. The far-field WPT
allows energy users (EUs) to harvest energy remotely from the
radio frequency signals radiated by energy transmitters (ETs) over
the air. For example, Powercast has developed energy receivers
that can harvest 10 microwatts (µW ) RF power from a distance
of 10 meters, which is sufficient to power the activities of many
low-power devices, such as wireless sensors and RF identification
(RFID) tags [2]. By flexibly adjusting the transmit power and
time/frequency resource blocks used by an ET, the WPT can meet
the dynamically changing real-time energy demands of multiple
EUs simultaneously. The WPT is hence becoming an important
building block of the next generation wireless systems [3]–[5].
Fig. 1 shows an example of a WPT system, where an ET trans-
mits power on three channels: GSM, 3G, and LTE. There are three
EUs, each of which can harvest power on a subset of the channels.
Here EUs can be heterogeneous in their channel conditions (due to
different distances from the ET), energy consumption rates (due
to different applications), and energy harvesting circuits (which
result in different channel availabilities). Due to the heterogeneous
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Fig. 1. A WPT system with 1 ET, 3 EUs and 3 channels. The broadcast
power can benefit all EUs, and it is regarded as a non-excludable public
good. The EUs are in general heterogeneous in terms of energy con-
sumption rates, batteries, channel conditions, and operating channels.
characteristics, different EUs have different energy demands and
value ET’s transmit power on different channels differently. In Fig.
1, for example, EU 3 is likely to have a higher energy demand
than EU 2, since EU 3 is more energy-hungry with a lower battery
status. Moreover, EU 1 is only equipped with energy harvesting
circuits for the 3G channel, hence he cannot harvest energy on the
other two channels.
To achieve the wide deployment of the WPT technology, one
needs to address the potential economic challenges in the future
WPT markets. One of such challenges is how an ET should
allocate the power across different channels to balance his own
operation cost and EUs’ heterogeneous power demands. There
has been much excellent prior work tackling this issue from a
centralized optimization point of view (e.g., [6]–[14]), assuming
that EUs are unselfish and will always truthfully reveal their
private information (such as the channel state information and
harvested power requirements) to the ET. In practice, however,
EUs may have their own interests as they may not be directly
controlled by the ET, hence they may choose to misreport their
private information if doing so can improve their own benefits.
For example, if the ET’s goal is to ensure fairness among EUs in
terms of their harvested power, an EU can report a smaller channel
gain in order to receive more power than what he deserves. To
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2our best knowledge, no existing work has addressed the network
performance maximization problem in a WPT network under such
a private information setting.
1.2 Challenges
To resolve the issue of private information, it is natural to
consider a decentralized market solution (e.g., pricing mechanisms
[15] and auctions [16]). For instance, in [16], the mobile users
determine their data demands by responding to the market price
and hence indirectly reveal their private information. Based on the
users’ response to the market price, the mechanism would adjust
the price to attain a market equilibrium. Such a mechanism works
well in many network resource allocation problems, where each
user only receives the benefit from the resource allocated to him.
However, this may not work well in the WPT system.
More specifically, the resource in the WPT systems, the wire-
less power broadcast on each channel, is a non-excludable public
good that is different from many previously considered wireless
resources.1 Due to the broadcast nature of wireless signals, each
EU’s received power only depends on his channel condition and
ET’s broadcast power.2 Therefore, one EU harvesting power from
the wireless signal does not affect the available energy to other
EUs, hence wireless power is non-rivalrous and thus a public
good. Furthermore, it is difficult to exclude some EUs from
harvesting the energy once the wireless signal is transmitted,
hence it is non-excludable. Hence, under a conventional market
mechanism approach, the paying EUs would purchase the wireless
power only to a self-satisfying level, while the remaining non-
paying EUs may silently free-ride the wireless power without any
payment. This eventually leads to an inefficient wireless power
provision. Such a free-rider problem does not occur in wireless
communication networks with unicast information (not power)
transmissions (e.g. [15], [16]), because the unicast information
data are private goods.3 That is, they are excludable due to
message encryption and rivalrous because the data dedicated to
one user typically does not benefit another user.
Although the WPT technology has been extensively studied in
the literature, the solution to the economic challenges (including
the nature of public goods and the private information) plays an
indispensable role in paving the way for widely deployment and
commercialization of the WPT networks.
1.3 Solution Approach and Contributions
Among solutions to the public provision problems in the
economics literature, the Lindahl taxation [17] is one of the
approaches that can achieve an efficient public goods provision in
a complete information setting. In the private information setting,
a promising solution is the Nash mechanism implementation of
1. An example of the non-excludable public goods is fireworks. First,
fireworks are non-excludable because it is impossible to prevent non-payers
from watching them. Second, in spite of how many people watch them, the
fireworks remain the same quality, hence are non-rivalrous.
2. In practice, there are several additional considerations that may affect the
public goods nature of wireless power. For example, the ET may use directional
antennas to enable the directional WPT, which can partially exclude an EU
from effectively harvesting the power. In addition, if an EU may choose to
move to a location that blocks the reception of another EU. This may affect
the non-rivalrous nature. As the first work studying the public goods nature
of wireless power, we consider a simple scenario with one omnidirectional
antenna and fixed channel conditions, and leave the aforementioned consider-
ations for future work.
3. To differentiate the meanings of “private” in different terms, we note that
the term “private information” means information asymmetry while the term
“private goods” implies excludability and rivalry.
the Lindahl allocation. In particular, it achieves the social welfare
optimum for the public goods economy [18] at every Nash equi-
librium (NE). The key idea is to design the taxation rules so as to
align each agent’s interest to maximize the social welfare, and thus
incentivize each agent to truthfully report his private information
regarding the marginal utility. The existing mechanisms ensure
economic properties such as budget balance (e.g., [19]–[24]).
Nevertheless, several issues remain unaddressed. First, the ex-
isting approaches cannot perfectly incentivize agents to voluntarily
participate in the mechanism. Without such a property, there may
exist free-riders opting out of the mechanism but still benefiting
from the public goods [25]. Second, practical wireless power
provision problems involve transmit power constraints (such as
the maximum transmit power constraint of the ET). However, the
existing distributed algorithms only guarantee to converge when
there is no public goods provision constraint (e.g., [21]–[24]). The
challenge for such an algorithm design lies in discontinuity of
agents’ payoffs, which makes the existing algorithmic approaches
inapplicable in our case. This motivates us to propose a two-phase
all-or-none scheme with proper economic mechanisms and the
distributed algorithms to resolve the above two issues.
For a power transfer scenario with multiple channels (as in
Fig. 1), we need to consider power allocation across different
channels. Such a scenario further brings a technical challenge:
each EU’s benefit may not be strictly concave in transmit power
vector over all channels. Moreover, the power allocation prob-
lem is not separable across channels, since each agent’s benefit
depends on the transmit power decisions across channels. This
feature complicates the design of our mechanism and distributed
algorithm. Based on the above discussions, we need to consider
the following questions:
Question 1. How should the ET design mechanisms to incentivize
the participation of EUs and maximize the overall benefits of the
WPT networks, in both single-channel and multi-channel settings?
Question 2. How should one design algorithms to reach an NE,
considering the public goods provision constraint?
We summarize our main contributions of this work as follows:
• Problem Formulation: To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first work that addresses a wireless resource
allocation problem from the perspective of non-excludable
public goods. In particular, we solve the effective WPT
provision problem considering the strategic EUs’ private
information.
• Mechanism Design: We propose a two-phase all-or-none
allocation scheme, and design a Power And Taxation
(PAT) Mechanism that is significantly simpler than the
existing schemes for public goods provision. Our scheme
can incentivize the EUs to voluntarily participate in the
mechanism, and can achieve several desirable economic
properties such as efficiency and budget balance.
• Distributed Algorithm Design: For the case of a single-
channel wireless power transfer, we propose a distributed
PAT (D-PAT) Algorithm under which the decisions of
ET and EUs are guaranteed to converge to an NE. We
prove its convergence by mapping the NE to the saddle
point of the Lagrangian of a related distributively solvable
optimization problem. The proof methodology suggests
a general distributed algorithm design methodology for
computing the NE of our game.
3• Multi-Channel Extension: In the multi-channel setting,
we present a Multi-Channel Power and Taxation (MPAT)
Mechanism which maintains the properties of the PAT
Mechanism. We further design a distributed MPAT (D-
MPAT) Algorithm and show its convergence to the NE
even if agents have non-strictly concave payoffs.
• Performance Evaluation: Compared with a benchmark
mechanism, the EUs’ average payoff under our proposed
schemes significantly increases in the number of EUs
increases. In addition, the proposed schemes are most
beneficial when EUs have more homogeneous channels.
We organize the rest of the paper as follows. In Section 2, we
review the related work. In Section 3, we introduce the system
model and the problem formulation. In Section 4, we propose
the constrained Lindahl allocation scheme. We propose the PAT
Mechanism and the D-PAT Algorithm for a single-channel system
in Section 5. We further propose the MPAT Mechanism and the
D-MPAT Algorithm for a multi-channel system in Section 6. In
Section 7, we provide numerical results to validate our analysis.
Finally, we conclude our work in Section 8.
2 RELATED WORK
Most of the studies on WPT networks focused on the system
optimization with unselfish users (e.g., [6]–[14]), where ETs and
EUs are willing to truthfully report their private information and
follow the optimization result. Specifically, references [6], [7] pro-
posed efficient schemes to optimize the long-term ET placement,
references [8]–[13] considered the wireless resource allocation in
WPT networks, and reference [14] considered optimal wireless
charging policy to optimize the communication performance.
To the best of our knowledge, there is only one recent study
on the game-theoretical analysis of the power provision problem
in WPT networks with selfish EUs [26]. Specifically, Niyato et al.
in [26] formulated a bidding game for a simple WPT system and
analyzed the NE of the game. The equilibrium of the game does
not maximize the system performance. Our work differs from [26]
in that we aim to achieve a socially optimal system performance
through mechanism design.
There are several related works on Nash implementation for
public goods (e.g., [19], [20]). Specifically, Hurwicz in [19]
presented a Nash mechanism that yields the social optimum
for a public goods economy, and the mechanism also ensures
individually rationality and budget balance. Sharma et al. in [20]
extended the results in [19] to a more general local public goods
scenario with the CDMA networks as an example. However,
references [19], [20] did not consider how the agents should
iteratively update the messages to converge to the NE under private
information. Another related study [27] considered the network
security investment as non-excludable public goods and studied a
mechanism. However, the studied scheme cannot always achieve
the efficient public goods provision as we do in our paper.
Only few papers proposed public goods mechanisms together
with the corresponding updating processes that converge to the
NE [21]–[24], where the best response dynamics [21]–[23] and
the gradient-based dynamics [24] can provably converge to the NE
under some technical conditions. However, these prior algorithms
are not directly applicable in our model. This is because algo-
rithms in [21]–[24] relied on the continuity of the best response
dynamics or the gradient-based dynamics. Our constrained public
goods setting introduces the discontinuity, and hence requires new
distributed algorithms for the constrained public goods provision
problem (due to the ET’s transmit power constraint).
Moreover, all the above studies did not consider the voluntary
participation issue for non-excludable public goods. In our work,
we will show that if the ET knows the total number of EUs, then
a two-phase scheme can ensure voluntary participation.
3 SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we introduce the system model that captures
several unique characteristics of the WPT problem and provide a
practical example model to illustrate the potentials of future WPT
markets. Accordingly, we formulate the public goods provision
problem, with the goal to maximize the social welfare.
3.1 System Model
ET and EUs: We consider a WPT system consisting of one
ET transmitting power over N channels (bands) to a group of
K EUs.4 Let N = {1 ≤ n ≤ N} be the set of channels and
K = {1 ≤ k ≤ K} be the set of EUs. We further use agent 0 to
denote the ET, hence the total set of decision makers in the system
is K ∪ {0}. For the purpose of presentation, we will refer to the
ET as “she” and an EU as “he”. The ET has an omnidirectional
antenna and transmits wireless energy over the channels.5 Each
EU has one energy receiver, but can potential receive energy
from multiple channels. Different EUs can experience different
time-varying channel conditions due to shadowing and fading.
We consider a time period long enough such that the small-scale
channel fading effects are averaged out and the channel conditions
are stationary.
Power and Cost: The ET transmits a power of pn (Watts) over
channel n. We denote p = {pn}n∈N as the ET’s transmit power
vector of all channels in N . The ET incurs a cost of C(p), which
is a positive, increasing, continuously differentiable, and (not
necessarily strictly) convex in p. The cost function can capture, for
example, both the energy consumption cost and the maintenance
cost for the ET’s operation. A strictly convex cost function may
capture an increasing marginal cost of power transmission, which
is due to several reasons such as
• the electricity tariff structure in many countries [28];
• the increasing chance of transmitter failure as transmit
power increases [29];
• the negative impact to other wireless networks due to a
stronger interference [30].
Transmit Power Constraints of the ET: Let
∑
n∈N pn ≤ Pmax
represent the ET’s total power constraint over all channels, and
let pn ≤ Ppeak,n represent the ET’s peak power constraint for
channel n. These two types of constraints capture the limitation of
4. We consider low-mobility EUs such as sensors and IoT tags that are
typically deployed as fixed locations. Furthermore, we consider the wireless
power transfer by dedicated base stations: each having a fixed and stable
coverage range and operating independently with others. Such an arrangement
can help ensure good QoS for the EUs, i.e., their received power levels can be
orders-of-magnitude higher than that achieved by the traditional environmental
RF energy harvesting, where each device harvests from multiple sources
randomly and has to leverage mobility to improve average power harvested.
5. For the directional multi-antenna WPT and/or multi-ET networks, it
is possible to extend our idea by further formulating a multiple public
goods provisioning problem. We discuss the potential multi-ET extensions
in Appendix C.2 and consider multi-antenna WPT in future work.
4the physical circuits and regulations.6 The transmit power p thus
lies in the set of
P =
{
p :
∑
n∈N
pn ≤ Pmax, 0 ≤ pn ≤ Ppeak,n, ∀n ∈ N
}
. (1)
Both C(p) and P are ET’s private information and are not known
by the EUs.
Utility of EUs: For EU k ∈ K, let hk,n denote his channel gain
over channel n, let hk = {hk,n}n∈N denote his overall channel
gain vector, and let Ik denote the received ambient wireless
power apart from the the ET’s transmitted wireless power (e.g.
the wireless signal generated by the cellular networks). Here we
assume that hk represents EU k’s long-term average channel gain.
Given the ET’s transmit power p, EU k’s total received power is
qk(p) =
∑
n∈N
hk,npn + Ik. (2)
Throughout this paper, we assume Ik = 0 for all EUs k without
loss of generality.7
Each EU k has a utility function Uk(qk(p)), which is strictly
concave, increasing, and continuous, which can reflect
• an EU’s overall valuation of the received power consid-
ering his battery status and energy consumption level;
the strict concavity follows the generic economic law of
“diminishing marginal return” [18];
• the fairness consideration as can be captured by the
widely-used α-fair utility function [32]. The fairness is
an important consideration due to the “doubly-near-far”
problem in the wireless powered communications [3].
As a concrete example of EUs’ strictly concave, increasing,
and continuous utility functions, we consider a wireless powered
communication network [3], [4]:
Example 1. EUs use harvested energy to transmit information
to other devices. We denote by T1 the amount of time for WPT
and T2,k the amount of time for EU k to transmit information,
respectively. Let B be the bandwidth of each EU k’s information
transmission channel; let gk be EU k’s channel gain for the
information transmission; let σ2 be the noise power. Thus, each
EU k’s utility can be his achievable throughput, given by
Uk(qk(p)) = T2,kB log
(
1 +
gkqk(p)T1
σ2T2,k
)
, (3)
which is strictly concave, increasing, and continuous in qk(p).
Both Uk(·) and hk are EU k’s private information and are not
known by the ET or other EUs.
3.2 Example Model
We present a practical long-range (100 meters) WPT system
to illustrate the potentials of future WPT markets.
Example 2. We consider a macro LTE cell base station, of which
the typical transmit power is Pt = 43 dBm with an antenna gain
of Gt = 15 dBi at an LTE band of a typical frequency f0 = 1.9
6. For example, Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in the US
imposes a Maximum Effective Isotropic Radiated Power (EIRP) of 4 W (36
dBm) in the band of 902 to 928 MHz [31].
7. This is because for any arbitrary positive Ik and Uk(·), we can always
find another increasing, strictly concave, and continuous utility function U˜k(·)
such that U˜k(qk(p)− Ik) = Uk(qk(p)) for all p ∈ P .
GHz [33]. For a receive antenna gain of Gr = 0 dBi, the received
power by the Friis equation at a distance of d = 100 meters is
Pr(dB) = Pt +Gt +Gr + 20 lg
(
c
4pidf0
)
= −20.02 dBm,
which is enough to power wireless sensors [5], [34], [35]. The
WPT for a longer distance is achievable by more powerful trans-
mitters (e.g. TV towers). For instance, the wireless transmission of
the Tokyo Tower can power a wireless sensor 6.6 km away [36].
3.3 Problem Formulation
We assume that a network regulator operates the ET and aims
to optimize the system performance. Our analysis also applies to
the case where the ET is a self-interested decision maker. This
is because the ET also participates in the PAT Game defined in
Section 5 (or the MPAT Game defined in Section 6) as a rational
player to maximize her payoff.8 Specifically, the ET is interested
in choosing the transmit power p to solve the following Social
Welfare Maximization (SWM) Problem:
(SWM) max
p
SW (p) ,
∑
k∈K
Uk(qk(p))− C(p) (4a)
s.t. p ∈ P. (4b)
The objective function of the SWM Problem is concave and the
constraint set is compact and convex.
To solve the SWM Problem in a centralized fashion, the ET
needs to know the complete information of the EUs (i.e., utility
functions Uk(·) and qk(p) for all k). This is difficult to achieve in
practice, since EUs may not want to report their utility functions
or their channel gains, as doing so may not maximize their own
benefits. Hence, we need to design economic mechanisms to solve
the SWM Problem, considering EUs’ private information and the
public goods nature of wireless power.
3.4 Desirable Mechanism Properties
In this paper, we will design an economic mechanism that
satisfies the following four desirable economic properties:
• (E1) Efficiency: Maximizes the social welfare, i.e.,
achieves the optimal solution of the SWM Problem.
• (E2) Incentive compatibility: An EU should (directly or
indirectly) truthfully reveal his private marginal utility.
• (E3) Voluntary participation: An agent should get a non-
negative payoff by participating in the market mechanism.
• (E4) (Strong) Budget balance: The total payment from
the EUs equals the revenue obtained by the ET. In other
words, if the mechanism is administrated by a third-party,
then there is no need to inject money into the system.
We would like to clarify some aspects with respect to the
existing mechanism design literature. First, for a direct mecha-
nism, (E2) usually indicates that the mechanism can fully reveal
the participants’ utility functions. However, [38] proved that there
does not exist any public goods mechanism that satisfies (E1) and
induces direct and truthful revelation at the same time. Hence, we
8. However, in the case where the ET is a self-interested decision marker,
we need to introduce a third-party network regulator, who serves as a
coordinator that collects the price and power proposals from the agents, for
implementing the D-PAT Algorithm and the D-MPAT Algorithm. It is possible
to further design profit-maximizing mechanisms by integrating the existing
profit-maximizing mechanisms for private goods (e.g. [37]) and our proposed
mechanisms. We will study this interesting direction in the future work.
5focus on the indirect revelation, in the sense that the mechanism
reveals EUs’ marginal utility at NEs.
Existing results on Nash mechanisms have focused on achiev-
ing (E1), (E2), and (E4), without considering (E3) [19]–[24]. The
common assumption in these prior studies is that there exists
a “government” that has enough power to force all agents to
participate in the mechanism [19]–[24]. However, such mandatory
participation may not be easily enforceable in reality.9
Saijo and Yamato in [25] showed that there does not exist a
mechanism that guarantees (E1), (E3), and (E4) simultaneously for
non-excludable public goods. Nevertheless, the key assumption in
[25] is that consumers (which correspond to EUs in our model) can
directly access the production technology and produce the non-
excludable public goods themselves (even without participating in
the mechanism). This assumption does not hold in our model, as
we assume that EUs cannot access other energy sources other than
the ET. Hence it is possible to design a mechanism that achieves
(E1)-(E4), as shown in Section 5.
4 CONSTRAINED LINDAHL ALLOCATION SCHEME
Before explaining our proposed mechanism, we first propose
a constrained Lindahl allocation scheme in this section. We then
show that, in a complete information setting, such an allocation
scheme can lead to the self-enforcing and socially optimal transmit
power in the WPT systems. Under incomplete information, we
will further design mechanisms to implement the constrained
Lindahl allocations (in Sections 5-6).
Consider a linear taxation scheme, under which there is a
tax rate Rk,n for each agent k ∈ K ∪ {0} on channel n.
Let Rk = {Rk,n}n∈N denote the tax rate vector for agent
k ∈ K ∪ {0}. Based on the corresponding tax rate, each EU
k pays pTRk =
∑
n∈N pnRk,n to the ET; the ET receives a
reimbursement −pTR0 = −
∑
n∈N pnR0,n. For presentation
simplicity, we let pTR0 denote the payment for the ET.
Suppose that the agent k ∈ K∪{0} can determine the transmit
power considering his/her payment pTRk. Agent k aims to find
a transmit power pPMk to solve the payoff maximization problem:
pPMk =
{
arg maxp Uk(qk(p))− pTRk, if k ∈ K,
arg maxp∈P − pTR0 − C(p), if k = 0.
(5)
For each EU k, we have that the optimal solution pPMk satisfies
10
∇pUk(qk(pPMk )) = Rk. (6)
In the following, we introduce a specific taxation scheme,
namely Lindahl tax [17]. Such a taxation scheme incentivizes
agents to agree on provisioning the public goods to the socially
optimal level, which constitutes a Lindahl allocation. However,
the Lindahl tax scheme in the existing literature does not consider
the public goods provision constraint. Therefore, we propose the
constrained Lindahl allocation scheme as follows.
Scheme 1 (Constrained Lindahl Allocation Scheme). The con-
strained Lindahl allocation is a tuple ({R∗k}k∈K∪{0},po):
9. In Japan, for example, it is mandatory to pay a TV public broadcasting fee
if one owns a device that can receive a TV broadcast signal. The punishment
for non-paying individuals, however, is practically non-existent due to the
difficulty of enforcement.
10. It is possible that there does not exist an optimal solution ifRk is poorly
designed (e.g. some Rk,n ≤ 0 for some n). However, any optimal solution, if
exists, should satisfy (5).
(a) (b)
Optimal 
Power
p
o pPmax p =
p
Pmax
o
) !"(#"$
 $
) !%(#%$
 $
) !"(#"$
 $
) !%(#%$
 $
)&'*(+*,
&,
+ 
)&'-(+-,
&,
)&'*(+*,
&,
+ 
)&'-(+-,
&,
)./($
)./($
0"
1 2 0%
1
0"
1
0"
1 2 0%
1
0"
1
0%
10%
1
Fig. 2. Illustrative examples of the constrained Lindahl allocation with (a)
a slack constraint and (b) a tight constraint. The feasible transmit power
set is P = [0, Pmax].
1) The transmit power vector po is an optimal solution to
the SWM Problem.
2) Lindahl tax rateR∗k for each agent k ∈ K∪{0} satisfies
a) R∗k = ∇pUk(qk(po)), for each EU k ∈ K;
b) R∗0 = −
∑
k∈KR
∗
k, for the ET.
Intuitively, being charged the corresponding constrained Lin-
dahl tax R∗k, each EU k’s optimal solution to (5) is the socially
optimal transmit power po, as shown from (6). Similarly, we can
also show that the socially optimal transmit power po is also the
optimal solution to the ET’s problem in (5). This indicates that
under the constrained Lindahl tax, every agent prefers the socially
optimal transmit power to all other power choices.
In Fig. 2, we present illustrative examples of the constrained
Lindahl allocation scheme for a single-channel WPT system,
with one ET and two EUs. The horizontal axis corresponds to
the transmit power. The vertical axis represents each agent’s
marginal utility (for the EUs) or cost (for the ET). Fig. 2(a)
describes the case where the maximal transmit power Pmax is
sufficiently large. In this case, from (4), the socially optimal
transmit power po corresponds to the intersection of the ET’s
marginal cost functionC ′(p) and the two EUs’ aggregate marginal
utility functions
∑
i∈{1,2} ∂Ui(hip)/∂p. Fig. 2(b) corresponds to
the more complicated case where Pmax is not large enough. More
specifically, Pmax is smaller than the intersection point of the
two curves
∑
i∈{1,2} ∂Ui(hip)/∂p and C
′(p), and the socially
optimal transmit power po equals Pmax in this case.
As shown in both Fig. 2(a) and Fig. 2(b), the constrained
Lindahl tax rate R∗k for EU k is exactly his marginal utility at
the optimal transmit power. Note that if we substitute R∗k into
Rk in (5), we have pPMk = p
o from (6). That is, each EU’s best
power purchase under the constrained Lindahl tax rate is to choose
the optimal transmit power po. In Fig. 2(a), when the constraint
is slack, ET’s reimbursement per unit of power is R∗1 + R
∗
2,
which is equal to her marginal cost C ′(po). From (5), we see
that pPM0 = p
o. In Fig. 2(b), however, the constraint is tight. This
means that ET’s reimbursement R∗1 + R
∗
2 is larger than the ET’s
marginal cost C ′(po), which means that the ET aims to transmit
as much as possible, i.e., pPM0 = p
o = Pmax.
The interpretation of the constrained Lindahl allocation
scheme is as follows. Suppose that each EU can freely determine
the transmit power under the corresponding constrained Lindahl
tax rate. In this case, each agent’s optimal decision is the socially
optimal transmit power, i.e., no agent has the incentive to deviate
from the socially optimal power. Therefore, the constrained Lin-
dahl tax rates make all EUs come to a consensus of the transmit
power, i.e., the socially optimal outcome.
6Phase I: Each EU decides whether to 
participate in the PAT Mechanism.
Phase II-Y: Use the PAT Mechanism to 
determine the transmit power and taxes.
Phase II-N: NO WPT or trade.
Does every EU choose
 to participate?
Yes No
Fig. 3. The two-phase all-or-none scheme.
The above discussions assume that the ET knows the complete
information regarding EUs’ utility functions. However, in reality,
the ET cannot readily obtain such information. As a result, each
EU has an incentive to under-report his utility to the ET to reduce
his payment. This leads to the free-riding EUs. The under-reported
utilities may distort the taxation scheme and lead to an inefficient
transmit power (comparing with the socially optimal value). The
consideration of such a realistic incomplete information scenario
motivates us to design new mechanisms in Section 5 for the single-
channel scenario and in Section 6 for the multi-channel case,
to achieve the constrained Lindahl allocation at an equilibrium
without relying on complete network information.
5 SINGLE-CHANNEL NASH MECHANISM
In this section, we start with a single-channel scenario with
incomplete information. For a better readability, we will drop the
index n in hk,n and pn in this section. We can express the feasible
transmit power region as P = [0, Pmax], where Pmax is the ET’s
maximum transmit power. We further focus on the case where
there are K ≥ 2 EUs. Appendix C discusses the single-EU case.
We propose a two-phase all-or-none scheme, including a
PAT Nash Mechanism in Phase II. We show that under the
proposed scheme, the agents’ equilibrium strategies coincide with
constrained Lindahl allocation (given in Definition 1) and achieve
(E1)-(E4). We further propose a D-PAT Algorithm that converges
to an NE of an induced game, of which the challenge mainly lies
in the transmit power constraint.
5.1 Two-Phase All-or-None Scheme
We propose a two-phase all-or-none scheme, as shown in Fig.
3. In Phase I, each EU sends a 1-bit message to the ET indicating
whether or not he will participate in the Power and Tax (PAT)
mechanism (to be described in Section 5.2). In Phase II, if all
agents are willing to participate, the ET and the EUs will execute
the PAT Mechanism in Phase II-Y; otherwise, the ET will transmit
zero power and no trading occurs in Phase II-N. Here we adopt
the following assumption throughout the paper:
Assumption 1. The ET knows the total number of EUs, K .
Under Assumption 1, the ET will know whether some EU
keeps silent without sending any indication at the end of Phase I.
Assumption 1 is satisfied, for example, when all EUs also actively
transmit information (to the ET or other EUs) (e.g., in wireless
sensor networks) and hence can be detected by the ET [3]. Even
for passive (silent) EUs, it is possible to detect their existence
from the local oscillator power inadvertently leaked from their
(receiving) communication circuits [39]. We provide the detailed
discussions of a potential direction to extend our mechanism to
the case of the unknown K in Appendix C.3.11
11. If Assumption 1 is not satisfied, the results in the literature assert that no
mechanism can achieve the properties (E1)-(E4) simultaneously [25].
Assumption 1 ensures that such an all-or-none scheme can
prevent free-riders, i.e., those EUs who do not participate in the
PAT Mechanism but harvest the energy (without paying any tax).
We will prove this property in Section 5.3.2.
5.2 Nash Mechanism
Next, we describe the PAT Mechanism in Phase II-Y.
Mechanism 1. Power And Taxation (PAT) Mechanism
• The message space: Each agent k ∈ K ∪ {0} sends a
message mk ∈ R2 to the ET:
mk , (γk, bk), (7)
where γk and bk are agent k’s power proposal and price
proposal, respectively. Note that the ET (agent 0) also
needs to send a message m0 (to herself). We denote the
message profile as m = {mk}k∈K∪{0}.
• The outcome function: The ET computes the transmit
power p based on the agents’ power proposals:
p(m) =
1
K + 1
∑
k∈K∪{0}
γk. (8)
The ET further computes the tax rate Rk for agent k ∈ K
based on the agents’ price proposals:
Rk(m) = bω(k+1) − bω(k+2), ∀k ∈ K ∪ {0}, (9)
where ω(k) = mod(k,K + 1).12 The ET will announce
(p(m), Rk(m)) to agent k, and agent k needs to pay the
following tax to the ET,
tk(m) =Rk(m)p(m), ∀k ∈ K ∪ {0}. (10)
Next we mention several key features of the PAT Mechanism.
First, the determination of the transmit power p in (8) depends on
every agent’s power proposal. Second, agent k’s tax rate in (9)
does not depend on his own price proposal bk. Finally, the agents’
taxes in (10) cancel each other, i.e.,∑
k∈K∪{0}
tk(m) = 0, ∀m ∈ R2(K+1), (11)
showing the satisfaction of the budget balance property (E4).
The PAT Mechanism is motivated by the Hurwicz mechanism
[19]. In [19], each agent can only select the price proposal from
R+, and the tax function is computed in a complicated function
form: tk = Rkp + bk(γk − γω(k+1))2 − bω(k+1)(γω(k+1) −
γω(k+2))
2. In our proposed scheme, the power is computed in the
same way in [19] as in (8). A key contribution of this paper is
that our proposed PAT Mechanism is considerably simpler than
the Hurwicz mechanism in [19] but achieves the same desirable
economic properties, as explained next.
5.3 Properties of the PAT Mechanism
In this subsection, we will prove that the PAT Mechanism
achieves the economic properties of (E1) and (E3). Specifically,
we will first analyze agents’ decisions in Phase II, assuming that
every agent chooses to participate in Phase I. Then we return to
Phase I to analyze agents’ participation decisions.
12. Operator mod is the modulo operator. For example, when K = 4, we
have ω(13) = mod(13, 4 + 1) = 3.
75.3.1 Analysis of Phase II
The PAT Mechanism induces a game among agents in Phase
II, which we simply refer to as the PAT Game.
Game 1. PAT Game (Induced by the PAT Mechanism in Phase II)
• Players: all agents in K ∪ {0}.
• Strategy: mk ∈ R2 described in (7) for each agent k ∈
K ∪ {0}.
• Payoff function Jk(p, tk) : for each EU k ∈ K
Jk(p, tk) = Uk(hkp)− tk; (12)
for the ET (agent 0)
J0(p, t0) =
{
−C(p)− t0, if p ∈ P,
−∞, otherwise. (13)
The value −∞ can be interpreted as an infinite penalty for the
ET if she violates the maximum power constraint. Note that the
ET’s payoff function in (13) is discontinuous due to the constraint
p ∈ P . This leads to a key challenge for the distributed algorithm
design discussed later in Section 5.4.
Definition 1 (Nash Equilibrium (NE)). An NE of the PAT Game
is a message profile m∗ that satisfies the following condition:
Jk (p(m
∗), tk (m∗)) ≥ Jk
(
p(mk,m
∗
−k), tk
(
mk,m
∗
−k
))
,
∀mk ∈ R2, k ∈ K ∪ {0}, (14)
where m∗−k , {m∗l }l 6=k,l∈K∪{0} is the NE message profile of all
other agents except agent k.
Traditionally, an NE describes the agents’ stable strategic
behaviors in a static game with complete information [40]. How-
ever, the agents in our WPT system do not know the private
information (i.e., utilities, cost, or the transmit power constraint)
of others. Here, we adopt the interpretation of [41], [42], i.e.,
NE corresponds to the “stationary” messages profile of some
message exchange process (to be described later in Section 5.4)
that possesses the equilibrium property in (14).
To analyze an NE of the PAT Game, we summarize the
sufficient and necessary conditions for an NE in Lemma 1, with
its proof presented in Appendix A.2.
Lemma 1. A message profile m∗ = {(γ∗k , b∗k)}k∈K∪{0} is an
NE if and only if the following conditions are satisfied,
γ∗k = (K + 1) arg maxp Jk(p,R
∗
kp)−
∑
l 6=k,l∈K∪{0}
γ∗l , (15)
for every agent k ∈ K ∪ {0}, where R∗k , b∗ω(k+1) − b∗ω(k+2) is
the NE tax rate for agent k.
To understand Lemma 1, let p∗ denote the NE transmit power.
From (8), we have p∗ =
∑
l∈K∪{0} γ
∗
l /(K + 1). This allows us
to rewrite (15) as,
p∗ = arg max
p
Jk(p,R
∗
kp), ∀k ∈ K ∪ {0}. (16)
Equation (16) implies that under the NE tax rates {R∗k}k∈K∪{0},
the common NE transmit power p∗ maximizes every agent’s
payoff. Otherwise, one agent k would have the incentive to adjust
γk to change p(m∗) and improve his payoff. Therefore, an NE
only occurs when all agents agree on the same transmit power.
We can show that there are multiple NEs for the PAT Game.
To see this, given any (γ∗, b∗), we can add every b∗k by the same
constant, while the new message profile (γ∗, b˜
∗
) still satisfies the
conditions described in (16) and thus is also an NE. However, we
can show that the NE allocation (p∗, t∗) = (p(m∗), t(m∗)) is
the same for all NEs, where p∗ corresponds to the unique optimal
solution of the SWM Problem. We can show that all NEs yield the
unique constrained Lindahl Allocation in the following theorem
(with its proof presented in Appendix A.3):
Theorem 1 (Implementing Constrained Lindahl Allocation).
There exist multiple NEs in the PAT Game, and all NEs correspond
to the unique constrained Lindahl allocation.
Proving the existence of NEs involves constructing an NEm∗
based on the optimal solution to the SWM Problem. Intuitively,
the tax rates defined in (9) ensure that the sum of all tax rates is
zero, i.e.,
∑
k∈K˜ Rk(m) = 0. Together with (16), we can derive
the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions for the SWM Problem
based on all agents’ optimality conditions of (16). The remaining
part of the proof for Theorem 1 involves showing that the NE
condition in (16) can lead to a unique tax rate R∗k for each agent.
The significance of Theorem 1 is three-fold. First, Theorem
1 shows that every NE of the PAT Game induced by the PAT
Mechanism yields the socially optimal transmit power level as
suggested in Definition 1. Second, Theorem 1 implies that the PAT
Mechanism is incentive-compatible (E2). This is because the NE
tax rates are the Lindahl taxes, which reveal every EU’s marginal
utility at the NEs by Definition 1. Third, each agent receives the
same payoff at every NE due to the uniqueness of the Lindahl
allocation. This means that each agent is indifferent to the choice
among multiple NEs.
However, there should be an effective approach of selecting
one NE from the multiple ones. Without such an agreement, the
agents’ distributed choices may not lead to an non-NE message
profile. We will resolve the above issue through a distributed
algorithm design in Section 5.4.
5.3.2 Analysis of Phase I
We now proceed to analyze agents’ decisions in Phase I,
where each agent compares the unique NE allocation (p∗, t∗) =
(p(m∗), t(m∗)) (where everyone participates in the PAT Mech-
anism) to the (0,0) allocation (where at least one agent chooses
not to participate). We can show that each EU will voluntarily
participate, with its proof in Appendix A.4.
Theorem 2 (Voluntary Participation). All agents will not be worse
off by participating in the PAT Mechanism.
Theorem 2 implies that all EUs choose to participate in the
PAT Mechanism in Phase I. The intuition is that, given arbitrary
messages from other agents in the PAT Game, an EU k or the
ET can always choose a power proposal γk so that the transmit
power is zero (hence his tax is zero due to (10)). Such a choice
is equivalent to the outcome where someone chooses not to
participate in Phase I. Hence, choosing to participate in Phase
I is a weakly dominant strategy for each EU. Here we assume
that each EU will voluntarily participate if he is not worse off
by doing so. This is without loss of generality, since in practice
we can let the ET offer an additional arbitrarily small amount of
benefit  > 0 to every EU who chooses to participate to break
the tie. In other words, this ensures that every EU can receive a
strictly positive payoff improvement by choosing to participate. In
addition, successfully inducing voluntary participation also relies
on one of the fundamental assumptions of neoclassical economics:
8Algorithm 1: Distributively Compute the NE of the PAT
Game (D-PAT Algorithm)
1 Initialize the iteration index τ ← 0 and step size {ρ(τ)}.
Each agent k ∈ K ∪ {0} randomly initializes mk(0). The
ET initializes the stopping criterion 1 > 0 and 2 > 0;
2 Set conv flag← 0 # initialize the convergence flag;
3 while conv flag = 0 do
4 Set τ ← τ + 1;
5 Each EU k ∈ K sends message mk(τ) to the ET;
6 The ET computes the tax rate Rk(τ) from (9) for each
agent k ∈ K ∪ {0};
7 The ET sends Rk(τ), γω(k−1)(τ) and γω(k−2)(τ) to
EU k, for each EU k ∈ K;
8 Each agent k ∈ K ∪ {0} computes γk(τ + 1) and
bk(τ + 1) as
γk(τ + 1) (17)
=
{
[arg maxp Jk(p,Rk(τ)p)]
Pupk
0 , if k ∈ K,
[arg maxp Jk(p,Rk(τ)p)]
Pmax
0 , if k = 0,
and
bk(τ + 1) (18)
=bk(τ) + ρ(τ)
(
γω(k−1)(τ)− γω(k−2)(τ)
)
,
where ρ(τ) is the step size;
9 if |bk(τ)− bk(τ − 1)| ≤ 1|bk(τ − 1)| and
|γk(τ)− γk(τ − 1)| ≤ 2|γk(τ − 1)|, ∀k ∈ K ∪ {0}
then
10 conv flag← 1 ;
11 end
12 end
13 The ET computes p(m(τ)) and t(m(τ)) using (8) and
(10);
agents make decisions rationally; irrational EUs may make the all-
or-none scheme fragile. We may tackle this issue using theories
from behavioral economic (e.g., cognitive hierarchy [43]).
We note that the EUs’ participation involves the energy con-
sumption due to the communication overhead of the proposed
algorithms. In this paper, we assume that such participation energy
overhead is negligible for each EU. Specifically, the participation
process is of a finite duration and the energy cost is one-time only.
Once the ET decides the policy, the resultant WPT is over a much
longer duration. Therefore, the energy harvested is much larger
than the energy overhead for each EU (if he decides to participate)
and thus we ignore the latter in our work for simplicity.
To summarize, we have shown that the two-phase all-or-
none scheme and the PAT Mechanism together can achieve the
desirable economic properties of (E1)-(E4). We will next propose
a distributed algorithm, under which the agents can achieve the
NE of the PAT Game.
5.4 Distributed Algorithm to Achieve the NE
As we mentioned previously, the private information setting
and the NE selection issues make it difficult for the ET and EUs to
directly compute their messages at an NE. Hence, we will propose
an iterative distributed algorithm for the ET and EUs to exchange
information and compute the NE. To prove the convergence of the
algorithm, we will establish the connection between the NE of the
PAT Game and the optimal primal-dual solution of a reformulation
of the SWM Problem.
Algorithm 1 illustrates the proposed iterative D-PAT Algo-
rithm, with the following key steps. Each agent k ∈ K ∪ {0}
initializes his arbitrarily chosen message mk(0) ∈ R2 (line
1). Then, the algorithm iteratively computes the messages until
convergence. In each iteration, first each EU k sends his message
to the ET (line 5). Then the ET computes each agent k ∈ K∪{0}’s
tax rate Rk(τ), and sends Rk(τ) together with agents ω(k − 1)
and ω(k − 2)’s price proposals (lines 6-7) to EU k. Accordingly,
each agent k ∈ K ∪ {0} updates his power proposal and his
price proposal (line 8), where [x]ba = max(min(b, x), a). Finally,
the ET checks the termination criterion (line 9). The termination
happens if both the relative changes of agents’ power proposals
and price proposals are small, determined by the positive constants
1 > 0 and 2 > 0. The ET finally computes the transmit power
and taxes (line 13).
Next, we discuss in details regarding the updates of messages
in line 8. First, for the power proposal update in (17), each
agent selects the power proposal equal to the transmit power that
maximizes his payoff. For each EU, we impose a power upper
bound P upk (which is a large enough constant
13), such that the
power proposal γk(τ) does not go to infinity (which can happen
when the tax rate Rk(τ) is negative and there is no power upper
bound). Second, the price proposal update in (18) is motivated
by Lemma 1, which suggests that the NE transmit power should
maximize every agent k’s payoff. As we can see, a larger bk
increases EU ω(k−1)’s tax rate and decreases ω(k−2)’s tax rate,
respectively, hence may reduce the gaps in their power proposals
according to (17).
Finally, we discuss the synchronization and overhead issues
of the D-PAT Algorithm. First, the D-PAT Algorithm should be
executed in a synchronous fashion, which requires a common
clock of all agents and a negligible delay for passing messages.
This can be achieved in a practical WPT network, since the ET
and the EUs are often physically close-by. Second, the distributed
algorithm has small communication and computation overheads.
Specifically, each agent k ∈ K ∪ {0} needs to send γk and bk to
the ET; the ET needs to send each EU k her tax rate and two other
agents’ proposals, for all k ∈ K∪{0}. Hence the communication
overhead is O(K) per iteration. The computational complexity
per iteration is O(1) for each EU and O(K) for the ET, since she
computes the tax rates for all EUs with a complexity of O(1).
5.5 The Convergence of the D-PAT Algorithm
There are two classes of existing dynamics that have been
shown to converge to the NE of various public goods provision
mechanisms: the best-response dynamics (e.g. [22], [23]) and the
gradient-based dynamics (e.g. [24]). These existing approaches,
however, all assume that there are no constraints on public goods
provision. This assumption does not hold in our model, since we
need to consider the maximum total transmit power constraint.
Hence we need to find a new way to prove the convergence of our
proposed D-PAT Algorithm.
The approach we take is to first reformulate the SWM Problem
with a decomposition structure, then connect the saddle point of
the Lagrangian of the reformulated problem and the NE of the
PAT game. We will show that the D-PAT Algorithm converges to
a saddle point and thus an NE of the PAT game.
13. For example, an EU can set the upper bound to be the maximal transmit
power of the local TV broadcast (e.g. 10 kW for the TV Tokyo).
95.5.1 Problem Reformulation
Inspired by [44], we reformulate the SWM Problem by intro-
ducing auxiliary variables pi = {pik}k∈K∪{0}, which decouple
agents’ utility and cost functions:
(R− SWM) max
pi
∑
k∈K
Uk(hkpik)− C(pi0) (19a)
s.t. pik = piω(k−1), ∀k ∈ K ∪ {0}, (19b)
pi0 ∈ P. (19c)
We can verify that the R-SWM Problem is equivalent to the SWM
Problem and has a unique optimal solution.
Compared with the reformulation in [44], here we introduce
the equality constraints in a different way14 to create the desired
structure of the following Lagrangian.
5.5.2 Lagrangian
We relax the equality constraints (19b) and define the La-
grangian of the R-SWM Problem as follows:
L(pi,β) , (20)∑
k∈K
Uk(hkpik)− C(pi0)−
∑
k∈K∪{0}
βk ·
(
pik − piω(k−1)
)
,
where βk is the dual variable (or the consistency price [44])
corresponding to the constraint pik = piω(k−1).
5.5.3 Dual Decomposition
The Lagrangian in (20) has a nice dual decomposition struc-
ture, i.e., L = ∑k∈K∪{0} Lk, where Lk is the decomposed
Lagrangian for each agent k ∈ K ∪ {0} as follows,
Lk(pik,β) =
{
Uk(hkpik)−
(
βk − βω(k+1)
)
pik, if k ∈ K,
−C(pik)−
(
βk − βω(k+1)
)
pik, if k = 0.
(21)
Define pi∗(β) , arg maxpi∈Γ L(pi,β), where Γ , {pi : pi0 ∈
P}. Thus, the dual problem of the R-SWM Problem is
min
β
∑
k∈K∪{0}
Lk(pi∗k(β),β). (22)
We define the saddle point of L as a tuple (pi∗,β∗) that satisfies:
L(pi,β∗) ≤ L(pi∗,β∗) ≤ L(pi∗,β), ∀pi ∈ Γ,β ∈ RK+1. (23)
For such a saddle point, we can show that pi∗ is the unique optimal
solution to the R-SWM Problem and β∗ is the optimal solution to
the dual problem in (22) [45, Chap. 5.4].15
5.5.4 Relation between the Saddle Point and the NE
If we set p = pik and bω(k+1) = βk, for all agents k ∈
K ∪ {0}, then in the PAT Game the Jk in (12)-(13) becomes
exactly the decomposed Lagrangian Lk, i.e.,
Jk(pik, (βk − βω(k+1))pik) = Lk(pik,β), ∀k ∈ K ∪ {0}. (24)
Proposition 1 characterizes the relation between a saddle point for
the Lagrangian in (20) and an NE of the PAT Game.
14. Specifically, the reformulation in [44] has the same form as in (34), as
we will introduce soon.
15. There are multiple optimal dual solutions β∗. To see this, given any
saddle point of (pi∗,β∗), we can add every β∗k by the same constant, and the
new tuple (pi∗, β˜∗) still satisfies the conditions described in (23) and thus is
also a saddle point.
Proposition 1. For any saddle point (pi∗,β∗) defined in (23), the
message profile mˆ = {(γk = pi∗k, bk = β∗ω(k−1))}k∈K∪{0} is an
NE of the PAT Game.
We present the proof of Proposition 1 in Appendix A.5. Intu-
itively, Lemma 1 asserts that an NE only occurs if all agents have
the same payoff-maximizing transmit power, given the equilibrium
tax rate R∗k. On the other hand, we attain the optimal dual solution
β∗ only when the maximizer of the Lagrangian L(pi,β∗) satisfies
the equality constraint in the constraint in (19b). Together with the
relation of Jk and Lk in (24), we can see that Proposition 1 holds.
The significance of Proposition 1 is two-fold. First, Proposition
1 provides a new interpretation of the messages of the PAT
Mechanism: the power proposal for each agent plays a role of
the auxiliary variable, while the price proposal plays a role of the
consistency price that pulls the auxiliary variables together.
Second, Proposition 1 also implies that for any distributed
algorithm with a provable convergence guarantee to a saddle point
of the Lagrangian in (20), we can design a corresponding dis-
tributed algorithm that converges to an NE of the PAT Game. This
property allows us to exploit the convergence properties of well-
designed optimization algorithms that the traditional approaches
in [21]–[24] may not possess. Such a property also facilitates
overcoming the additional technical challenge introduced in the
multi-channel model in Section 6.
We are ready to show the convergence of the D-PAT Algorithm
in the following theorem with the proof in Appendix A.6.
Theorem 3. When C(p) is strictly convex and the step size ρ(τ)
is diminishing16, the D-PAT Algorithm converges to a saddle point
of the Lagrangian in (20), hence an NE of the PAT Game.
The proof of Theorem 3 involves showing that the D-PAT
Algorithm is the gradient method for solving the dual problem
in (22). We can guarantee its convergence [46] if we employ the
bounded gradients, which is satisfied due to the bounds in (17).
Note that the gradient method requires the strict concavity of
each decomposed Lagrangian Lk. Thus, a linear cost function
C(p) cannot meet this requirement. However, we can adopt the
algorithm to be introduced in Section 6.2, which guarantees its
convergence even if C(p) is linear.
6 MULTI-CHANNEL NASH MECHANISM
We now turn to the problem for a general multi-channel WPT
network, where the ET can transmit over N ≥ 1 orthogonal chan-
nels. The multi-channel WPT network brings a new consideration
of allocating power across available channels. We will consider
the multi-channel extension to achieve (E1)-(E4).
Such a new algorithm design is non-trivial, because each
agent’s payoff function couples the transmit power decision across
all channels. In addition, agents’ payoff functions may not be
strictly concave. Note that even if Uk(·) is a strictly concave in
qk, it may not be strictly concave in p when hk,n = 0 for some
channel n. For example, consider a system with N = 2 channels
and U1 = log(1 + h1,1p1) (i.e., EU 1 only operates on channel
1). The Hessian matrix of EU 1’s utility function with respect to p
is given by H1 =
(
− h
2
1,1
(1+h1,1p1)2
0
0 0
)
. For every p ∈ P , the
Hessian is negative semi-definite but not negative definite. Hence,
16. An example of the diminishing step size is κ(τ) = (1+ τ)/(c+ τ) for
a constant c > 0.
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EU 1’s utility is concave but not strictly concave in p. Thus, we
cannot directly adopt a gradient-based algorithm similar to the D-
PAT Algorithm. Instead, we consider an algorithm based on the
augmented Lagrangian method to distributively compute the NE.
6.1 Nash Mechanism
In this subsection, we design the Nash mechanism for the
multi-channel network. We then show the proposed two-phase
all-or-none scheme together with a new mechanism achieves the
economic properties (E1)-(E4) for the multi-channel network.
We propose Mechanism 2, which is a generalization of the PAT
Mechanism. Specifically, each agent submits a message for every
channel even if he can only operate on a subset of all channels.
Mechanism 2. Multi-Channel Power and Taxation (MPAT) Mech-
anism
• The message space: Each agent k ∈ K ∪ {0} sends a
message mk ∈ R2N to the ET of the following form:
mk , (γk, bk), (25a)
γk , {γk,n}n∈N , bk , {bk,n}n∈N , (25b)
where γk,n and bk,n are agent k’s power proposal and
price proposal for channel n ∈ N , respectively. We denote
the message profile as m = {mk}k∈K∪{0}.
• The outcome function: The ET announces the transmit
power on each channel n to every agent:
pn(m) =
1
K + 1
∑
k∈K∪{0}
γk,n, ∀n ∈ N . (26)
The ET further computes the tax rate Rk(m) =
{Rk,n(m)}n∈N for agent k ∈ K based on the agents’
price proposals: for every k ∈ K∪{0} and every n ∈ N ,
Rk,n(m) = bω(k+1),n − bω(k+2),n. (27)
The ET announces EU k’s tax tk(m) = {tk,n(m)}n∈N :
for every k ∈ K ∪ {0} and every n ∈ N ,
tk,n(m) =Rk,n(m)pn(m). (28)
Equation (28) implies that
∑
k∈K∪{0} tk,n = 0, ∀n ∈ N .
Thus, the MPAT Mechanism achieves the budget balance (E4).
Similarly, the MPAT Mechanism induces the following MPAT
Game among agents in Phase II.
Game 2. MPAT Game (Induced in Phase II)
• Players: all agents in K ∪ {0}.
• Strategy: mk ∈ R2N described in (25) for each agent
k ∈ K ∪ {0}.
• Payoff function Jk(p, tk) : for each EU k ∈ K,
Jk(p, tk) = Uk (qk(p(m)))−
∑
n∈N
tk,n(m); (29)
for the ET (agent 0),
J0(p, t0) =
{
−C(p(m))−∑n∈N tk,n(m), if p ∈ P,
−∞, otherwise. (30)
Different from the single-channel scenario, the multi-channel
scenario may not admit a unique constrained Lindahl allocation.
This is mainly due to the non-strict concavity of the objective
of the SWM Problem (4a). However, we present the following
theorem with the proof in Appendix A.7:
Theorem 4. Each agent k ∈ K ∪ {0} receives the same payoff
across different constrained Lindahl allocations.
We prove Theorem 4 by establishing the uniqueness of the
received power for each EU, which leads to the uniqueness of each
agent’s payoff. Theorem 4 indicates that each agent is insensitive
to different constrained Lindahl allocations.
In the light of Theorem 4, we can show that the MPAT Mech-
anism achieves properties (E1)-(E3), with proofs in Appendices
A.8 and A.9, respectively.
Proposition 2 (Implementing Constrained Lindahl Allocations).
There exist multiple NEs in the MPAT Game, and each NE
corresponds to a constrained Lindahl allocation.
Proposition 3 (Voluntary Participation). Each agent will partici-
pate in the MPAT Mechanism in Phase I.
To summarize, we have shown that every agent is indifferent
to the choices of the NEs. Moreover, the two-phase all-or-none
scheme and the MPAT Mechanism can achieve the desirable
economic properties (E1)-(E4) for the multi-channel system. We
next introduce the distributed algorithm.
6.2 Distributed Algorithm to Achieve the NE
In this subsection, we design the distributed algorithm for
agents to compute an NE of the MPAT Game. We have shown that
every NE leads to a constrained Lindahl allocation (Proposition
2) and all constrained Lindahl allocations are equivalent for
every agent (Theorem 4). Therefore, agents just need to agree
on reaching any of the NEs.
However, we cannot directly adopt a dual gradient-based
algorithm similar to the D-PAT Algorithm, which requires the
strict concavity of every agent’s payoff function. Instead, we
propose an alternative approach in Algorithm 2, which ensures
the convergence even if an agent’s payoff is not strictly concave.
We will show Algorithm 2 is based on the Accelerated Distributed
Augmented Lagrangians (ADAL) method [47] and prove its con-
vergence in Section 6.3.
Algorithm 2 illustrates the proposed iterative D-MPAT Algo-
rithm. The key difference compared with Algorithm 1 mainly lies
in the updated of messages, as described in the following. First,
for the power proposal update (31) (line 8), each agent maximizes
his/her payoff minus a quadratic penalty (due to inconsistency
with the agent ω(k − 1)’s power proposals); each agent updates
the power proposals by (32).17 One main benefit of including the
penalty term is that it ensures a unique solution of (33), therefore
admits gradient-like updates of proposals as in (31) and (32). This
resolves the drawback of the D-PAT algorithm of requiring the
strict concavity to make the gradient-based algorithms feasible.
Second, the price proposal update in (32) is similar to the D-PAT
algorithm, which is designed to reduce the gaps of their power
proposals according to (31).
The D-MPAT Algorithm should be executed in a synchronous
fashion. In addition, the distributed algorithm has a small commu-
nication complexity of O(KN) per iteration.
17. Here the parameter σ is the step size, which should be chosen in the
interval (0, 1/q), where q is the number of agents coupled in the “most
populated” constraint of the problem [47]. As we can observe, q = 2 in
our case, so we set σ = 1/4.
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Algorithm 2: Distributed Algorithm to Reach the NE of the
MPAT Game (D-MPAT Algorithm)
1 Initialize the iteration index τ ← 0. Each agent
k ∈ K ∪ {0} randomly initializes mk(0). The ET
initializes the stopping criterion 1 > 0 and 2 > 0;
2 Set conv flag← 0 # initialize the convergence flag;
3 while conv flag = 0 do
4 Set τ ← τ + 1;
5 Each EU k ∈ K sends his message mk(τ) to the ET;
6 The ET computes the tax rate Rk(τ) in (27) for each
agent k ∈ K ∪ {0};
7 The ET sends Rk(τ), γω(k−1)(τ) and γω(k−2)(τ) to
EU k, for all k ∈ K;
8 Each agent k ∈ K ∪ {0} computes γˆk(τ + 1) and
bk(τ + 1) as
γk(τ + 1) = γk(τ) + σ(γˆk(τ)− γk(τ)), (31)
and
bk(τ + 1) = bk(τ) + ρσ(γω(k−1)(τ)− γω(k−2)(τ)),
(32)9
where, for every agent k ∈ K ∪ {0},
γˆk(τ) (33)
=

arg maxp [Jk(p, tk(p, τ))
−∑n∈N ρ2 (pn − γω(k−1),n(τ))2], if k ∈ K,
arg maxp∈P [Jk(p, tk(p, τ))
−∑n∈N ρ2 (pn − γω(k−1),n(τ))2], if k = 0,10
tk(p, τ) = {tk,n(pn, τ)}, tk,n(pn, τ) = Rk(τ)pn,
ρ = 1, and σ = 1/4;
11 if |bk,n(τ)− bk,n(τ − 1)| ≤ 1|bk,n(τ − 1)| and
|γk,n(τ)− γk,n(τ − 1)| ≤ 2|γk,n(τ − 1)|, ∀k ∈
K ∪ {0} then
12 conv flag← 1;
13 end
14 end
15 The ET computes p(m(τ)) and t(m(τ)) using (26) and
(28);
6.3 Convergence of the D-MPAT Algorithm
Similar to the approach in Section 5.5, we can prove the con-
vergence of the D-MPAT Algorithm by reformulating the SWM
Problem in (4). Then, we demonstrate the connection between the
saddle point of the augmented Lagrangian of the reformulation
and the NE of the MPAT game. We next show that the D-MPAT
Algorithm is an ADAL-based algorithm that converges to a saddle
point and thus an NE of the MPAT game.
We present the following result with the detailed reformulation
of the SWM Problem in (4) and its proof in Appendix A.10.
Theorem 5. For any saddle point (pi∗,β∗) satisfying (59), the
message profile mˆ = {(γk,n = pi∗k,n, bk,n = β∗ω(k−1),n)} is an
NE of the MPAT Game. The D-MPAT Algorithm converges to a
saddle point and thus the NE of the MPAT Game.
The proof is similar to that of Proposition 1. Specifically, the
set of the solution to the reformulation of the SWM Problem in
(4) that satisfies the KKT conditions is a subset of the NE message
profile. In addition, we have shown that the D-MPAT Algorithm
based on the ADAL method converges to a saddle point of the
augmented Lagrangian in (57), hence an NE of the MPAT Game.
7 NUMERICAL RESULTS
Since we have proved the optimality and convergence of the
proposed algorithms, here we numerically evaluate the conver-
gence speed of proposed schemes. We further study the impacts
of the number of EUs and the channel diversity on the performance
of the proposed mechanisms.
7.1 Benchmarks
7.1.1 Distributed Pure Optimization (DPO) Algorithm
For the performance comparison purpose in terms of conver-
gence speed in Section 7.3.1, we consider a distributed pure opti-
mization (DPO) benchmark algorithm by adopting the following
standard reformulation in [44]:
max
pi
∑
k∈K
Uk(qk(pik))− C(pi0) (34a)
s.t. pik = pi0, ∀k ∈ K, pi0 ∈ P. (34b)
By doing so, we can use the algorithm in [47] to solve the problem.
Note that such an algorithm is a pure optimization algorithm that
relies on the strong assumption that EUs’ truthfully report their
private information to achieve the social optimum.
7.1.2 Private Goods Mechanism
For the performance comparison purpose in terms of the
achievable social welfare and the EUs’ average payoff in Section
7.3.2 and 7.3.3, we consider a private goods mechanism, which
is a standard benchmark as considered in [18, Chap. 11. C]. That
is, this benchmark treats the transmit power as a private goods
and ignores its public goods nature. Specifically, EUs play a
purchase game and each EU only pays for the transmit power
that he requests. The market adjusts the price such that power
supply equals the total power demand. Ignoring the wireless
signals’ public goods nature, the private goods mechanism cannot
prevent free-riders and may lead to inefficient power allocation.
We present the mechanism in details in Appendix B.
Reference [26] designed an interesting bidding mechanism for
a WPT network with one channel, with which we also compare
our PAT Mechanism in Appendix D.3.
7.2 Simulation Setup
We simulate the WPT operation in a time period of T = 1000
seconds. We assume that the ET’s cost function satisfies C(p) =
eT
(∑
n∈N pn
)ζ
, where the exponential model captures that the
failure rate (and thus the maintenance cost) of a transmitter grows
exponentially [29]. We set ζ = 1.1 and e = 0.5.
We adopt the following weighted α-fair utility function [32]
for each EU k ∈ K,
Uk
(∑
n∈N
hk,npn
)
=
Ek
Bk
(
∑
n∈N hk,npn)
1−α
1− α · T, (35)
where Ek > 0 represents the energy consumption rate for EU
k and Bk > 0 indicates the battery state of EU k. Parameters
Bk and Ek are uniformly and independently chosen from the
intervals [20, 50] and [0.1, 0.3], respectively. The distance dk
between the ET and each EU k follows the independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) uniform distribution from the interval
[1, r] (meter), where r is the cluster radius set to be 5 meter
unless stated otherwise. The channel gain follows the long-term
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path-loss model, hk,n = ak,nφnd
−3
k , where ak,n is a binary
parameter indicating whether EU k operates on channel n or
not; φn denotes a positive parameter related to carrier frequency.
Parameter ak,n follows the i.i.d. Bernoulli distribution, which
equals 1 with probability Prob and equals 0 with probability
1 − Prob. Parameter φn satisfies φn = (2.39 × 107/CFn)2
and CFn is the carrier frequency of channel n to be specified
later. We set Prob = 0.8 here, and we study the impact of Prob
on the performances in Appendix D.
7.3 Results
7.3.1 Convergence
We first evaluate the convergence speed of the proposed
algorithms and the DPO Algorithm mentioned in Section 7.1.1.
In Fig. 4, we plot the agents’ power proposals achieved by the
D-PAT Algorithm for a system with K = 3 EUs and N = 1
channel with a carrier frequency of 915 MHz. We set the upper
bounds for the power proposal to be P upk = 5 for all agents. The
power proposals converge to the socially optimal transmit power.
This is because we design the algorithms to satisfy the equality
constraints in (19b). In addition, for the D-PAT Algorithm, the EU
1’s submitted power proposal is 5 at the beginning. This happens
since EU 2 receives a negative tax rate R1 (not shown in the
figure) and thus submits the power proposal as large as possible.
In Fig. 5, we plot the agents’ power proposals achieved by
the D-MPAT Algorithm for a system with K = 2 EUs and N =
2 channels with carrier frequencies of 915 MHz and 950 MHz,
respectively. We observe that the power proposals converge to the
optimal transmit power on each corresponding channel.
In Fig. 6, we further assess the convergence speed of the D-
MPAT Algorithm for different numbers of the EUs and channels.
We set the convergence parameters to satisfy 1 = 2 = 0.05.
We show that the number of iterations for the D-MPAT Algorithm
to converge is slightly larger than that for the DPO benchmark
algorithm introduced in Section 7.1.1. Specifically, for the single-
channel scenario, both the DPO Algorithm and the D-MPAT Al-
gorithm converge within 40 iterations whenK ≤ 7. Moreover, the
number of iterations increases slightly in K , for both algorithms.
We observe a similar trend for the two-channel scenario.
Observation 1. Despite of the lack of complete information, our
MPAT Algorithm can elicit users’ truthful information without
much degradation of convergence speed.
7.3.2 Impact of the Number of EUs
We then study the impact of the number of EUs K on the
performance of the proposed MPAT Mechanism and the private
goods mechanism introduced in Section 7.1.2. In the following, we
consider a system ofN = 4 channels with with carrier frequencies
of {865, 890, 915, 950} MHz, respectively.
In Fig. 7(a), we can see that the social welfares achieved by
both schemes increase in K . Moreover, when K becomes larger,
the performance gap between Pmax = 1 W and Pmax = 4 W
also becomes larger for the MPAT Mechanism. This is because
as K becomes larger, a larger Pmax can allow a larger transmit
power that provides more benefits to more EUs in the MPAT
Mechanism at the social optimal solution. However, for the private
mechanism, a larger K does not significantly increase the demand
or the social welfare, since the free-rider issue of the private goods
mechanism leads to an inefficient power provision. Moreover, the
social welfare improvement of the proposed MPAT Mechanism
(compared with the private goods mechanism) increases in K ,
reaching 170% when K = 15 and Pmax = 4 W.
In Fig. 7(b), we can see that the average EUs’ payoff achieved
by both schemes increase in K . For the private goods mechanism,
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the EUs’ payoff slightly increases in K . This is due to the free-
rider issue in the private goods mechanism, i.e., each additional
EU tends to free-ride but not purchase wireless power, leading
to an insufficient transmit power provision level. On the other
hand, the proposed MPAT Mechanism can lead to a significant
improvement in the EUs’ average payoff. Hence, it shows the
significant social welfare benefit of preventing the free-riders.
Observation 2. Compared against the private goods mechanism,
the MPAT Mechanism can lead to significantly more EUs’ average
payoff improvement when the number of EUs increases.
As today’s wireless networks are becoming increasingly
denser, we believe that the proposed schemes will bring a sig-
nificant benefit to the overall system performance.
7.3.3 Impact of the Channel Diversity
We next study the impact of the channel diversity on the social
welfares, where the carrier frequencies are {865, 890, 915, 950}
MHz, respectively. The trend in terms of average EUs’ payoff is
similar and will be presented in Appendix D.
Fig. 8 compares the social welfares of the two schemes under
different cluster radius r. A larger cluster radius r implies that
EUs’ channel conditions are more diverse. In Fig. 8, for both
schemes, the achievable social welfare decreases as r increases,
since EUs experience a small channel gain. Moreover, the perfor-
mance gaps between the MPAT Mechanism and the private goods
mechanism decrease in r. As the cluster radius increases, so does
the diversity (difference) of EUs’ utility.18
Observation 3. The performance benefit of the MPAT Mechanism
is most significant when EUs have comparable channel gains.
8 CONCLUSION
Due to their broadcast nature, wireless signals are non-
excludable public goods in the WPT networks. We formulated the
first public goods problem for the WPT networks. We proposed
a simple Nash implementation PAT Mechanism (for a single-
channel scenario) and an MPAT Mechanism (for a multi-channel
scenario), considering agents’ selfish behaviors and private in-
formation. We then established the connection between the op-
timal solution of a reformulated optimization problem and the
equilibrium induced by the mechanism. This leads to a general
framework that allows us to adopt a wide range of distributed
optimization algorithms to compute the equilibrium induced by
some carefully designed mechanisms, and ensure the convergence
under some fairly general conditions (such as the non-strict con-
cavity and payoff discontinuity in this paper).
For the future work, it is interesting to consider the mechanism
design for simultaneous information and power transfer networks.
This demands a new mechanism accounting for both public goods
(wireless power) and private goods (information).
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APPENDIX A
PROOFS
To facilitate the following proofs, we start by presenting the
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions for the SWM Problem.
A.1 KKT Conditions for SWM Problem
We present the KKT conditions for the single-channel case
and the multi-channel case separately as follows.
A.1.1 The Single-Channel Case
∑
k∈K
∂Uk(hkp)
∂p
− ∂C(p)
∂p
− λ+ µ = 0, (36a)
λ(p− Pmax) = 0, (36b)
µp = 0, (36c)
p ∈ P, (36d)
λ, µ ≥ 0, (36e)
where λ is the dual variable corresponding to the constraint p ≤
Pmax, and µ is the dual variable corresponding to the constraint
0 ≤ p.
A.1.2 The Multi-Channel Case
∑
k∈K
∂Uk(qk(p))
∂pn
− ∂C(p)
∂pn
− λn − ν + µn = 0, ∀n ∈ N ,
(37a)
λn(pn − Ppeak,n) = 0, ∀n ∈ N ,
(37b)
ν
(∑
m∈N
pm − Pmax
)
= 0, (37c)
µnpn = 0, ∀n ∈ N ,
(37d)
p ∈ P, (37e)
λn, µn ≥ 0, ∀n ∈ N ,
(37f)
ν ≥ 0 (37g)
where λn is the dual variable corresponding to the constraint p ≤
Ppeak,n, µn is the dual variable corresponding to the constraint
0 ≤ pn, and ν is the dual variable corresponding to the constraint∑
m∈N pm ≤ Pmax.
It is easily to verify that the Slater’s condition holds for the
SWM Problem in (4a) [45]. Hence, the above KKT conditions
are both sufficient and necessary for the global optimality of the
corresponding SWM Problems.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 1
To prove the necessity of (15), we consider the following agent
k’s payoff maximization problem:
max
γk
Jk
γk + ∑
l 6=k,l∈K∪{0}
γ∗l , R
∗
k
γk + ∑
l 6=k,l∈K∪{0}
γ∗l
 ,
(38)
and a simplified problem:
max
p
Jk(p,R
∗
kp). (39)
We can see that the optimal values of (38) and (39) are the same,
since for any p and
∑
l 6=k,l∈K∪{0} γ
∗
l , there always exists a γk
such that (K + 1)p = γk +
∑
l 6=k,l∈K∪{0} γ
∗
l . Therefore, let γ
∗
k
be agent k’s NE power proposal (and hence the optimal solution to
(38)) and p∗ be the optimal solution to (39). The fact that problems
in (38) and (39) having the same optimal solutions implies
γ∗k +
∑
l 6=k,l∈K∪{0}
γ∗l = (K + 1)p
∗. (40)
This further leads to
γ∗k = (K + 1) arg maxp Jk(p,R
∗
kp)−
∑
l 6=k,l∈K∪{0}
γ∗l . (41)
This completes the proof.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 1
To prove Theorem 1, we first rewrite the necessary and
sufficient conditions for (15) in Lemma 1, and then prove the
existence and efficiency.
We rewrite the necessary and sufficient conditions for (15) in
Lemma 1 in the following:
1
K + 1
∑
l∈K∪{0}
γ∗l = p
∗, (42a)
∂Uk(hkp
∗)
∂p
− b∗ω(k+1) + b∗ω(k+2) = 0, k ∈ K (42b)
−C ′(p∗)− b∗1 + b∗2 − λ˜+ µ˜ = 0, (42c)
λ˜(p∗ − Pmax) = 0, (42d)
µ˜p∗ ≥ 0, (42e)
µ˜, p∗, λ˜ ≥ 0, (42f)
where (42b) is the first-order condition for each EU’s payoff
maximization problem, and (42c)-(42f) are the KKT conditions
of the ET’s payoff maximization problem.
A.3.1 Existence
Let (p∗, λ∗, µ∗) be the solution to the KKT conditions in
(36a)-(36e). There always exists a message profile (m∗ =
{(γ∗k , b∗k)}k∈K∪{0}, µ˜∗, λ˜∗) such that µ˜∗ = µ∗, λ˜∗ = λ∗,
γ∗k = p
∗, for all k ∈ K ∪ {0}, and
b∗k =

−∂C(p∗)∂p − λ˜∗ − µ˜∗, if k = 1,
0, if k = 2,
−∑k−2l=1 ∂Ul(hkp∗)∂p , if 3 ≤ k ≤ 0.
(43)
We observe that the message profile (m∗ =
{(γ∗k , b∗k)}k∈K∪{0}, µ˜∗, λ˜∗) satisfies (42a)-(42f). This indicates
that it is an NE. This completes the proof of existence.
A.3.2 Efficiency
Combining the first-order conditions for all EUs’ payoff max-
imization problem in (42b) and that for the ET’s problem in (42c),
we have ∑
k∈K
∂Uk(hkp
∗)
∂p
− ∂C(p
∗)
∂p
− λ˜+ µ˜ = 0. (44)
We can find that (44) and (42c)-(42f) are equivalent to the KKT
conditions for the SWM Problem in (36a)-(36e). In other words,
for every NE m∗, the resulted (p∗, µ˜∗, λ˜∗) satisfies the KKT
conditions in (36a)-(36e). Thus, at any NE, the socially optimal
transmit power is achieved.
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Moreover, since there exists a unique socially optimal transmit
power due to the strict concavity of the objective of the SWM
Problem, all NEs lead to the same socially optimal transmit power
po.
A.3.3 Lindahl Tax Rate
The tax rate for each EU is given by R∗k = b
∗
ω(k+1) −
b∗ω(k+2) = U
′
k(p
∗). Since the socially optimal transmit power
is unique, the tax rate for each EU is also unique due to (42b).
Therefore, the tax rate for the ET R∗0 = −
∑
k∈KR
∗
k is also
unique.
A.4 Proof of Theorem 2
By the definition of NE, we obtain
Jk(p(mk,m
∗
−k), tk(mk,m
∗
−k)) ≤ Jk(p∗, t∗k), ∀mk ∈Mk.
(45)
Since (45) holds for all mk = (γk, bk), substituting 1K+1 (γk +∑
l∈K∪{0} γ
∗
l ) = p¯ and the tax in (10), we have
Jk (p¯, R
∗
kp¯) ≤ Jk(p∗, t∗k), ∀p¯ ∈ R, ∀k ∈ K ∪ {0}. (46)
For p¯ = 0, (46) further implies that
Jk (0, 0) ≤ Jk(p∗, t∗k), ∀k ∈ K ∪ {0}, (47)
which means that each agent weakly prefers the allocation (p∗, t∗k)
when everyone participates, compared to the allocation when
someone chooses not to participate (0, 0). Hence, no matter other
agents choose to participate or not, it is a weakly dominant strategy
for each agent k to choose participating in the PAT Mechanism.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 1
The KKT conditions of the R-SWM Problem are given by
∂Uk(qk(pi
∗
k))
∂pik
− β∗k + β∗ω(k+1) = 0, ∀k ∈ K, (48a)
−∂C(pi
∗
0)
∂pi0
− β∗0 + β∗1 − λˆ+ µˆ = 0, (48b)
λˆ(pi∗0 − Pmax) = 0, (48c)
µˆpi∗0 = 0, (48d)
µˆ, λˆ ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ K ∪ {0}. (48e)
Let γk = pi∗k = p
o, for all k ∈ K ∪ {0}. We show that
{γk}k∈K∪{0} satisfies (42a). In addition, substituting bω(k+1)
into β∗k , we have that (48a)-(48e) have exactly the same structure
as (42b)-(42f), which implies that mˆ = {(γk = pi∗k, bk =
β∗ω(k−1))} satisfies the NE conditions in (42b)-(42f) and thus is
an NE.
A.6 Proof of Theorem 3
Let γk = pik and bk = βω(k−1). We observe that the D-
PAT Algorithm is a dual-based gradient method for solving the
following problem:
max
pi
Uk(qk(pik))− C(pi0) (49a)
s.t. pik = piω(k−1), ∀k ∈ K ∪ {0}, (49b)
pi0 ∈ P, (49c)
0 ≤ pik ≤ P upk , ∀k ∈ K. (49d)
Note that if EUs select large enough power upper bounds {P upk },
the problem in (49a)-(49d) yields exactly the same solution to that
of the R-SWM Problem. Specifically, (17) is the primal update
which computes the dual function given the dual variable in each
iteration, and (18) is the dual update to gradually solve the dual
problem in (22).
By [46], the gradient method converges to the optimal solution
if we employ (i) a diminishing step size and (ii) the bounded
gradients. The updated γk is bounded due to (17) and hence
the gradient is bounded. Thus, we have shown that the D-PAT
Algorithm converges to the optimal solution of (49a)-(49d) and
thus to an NE of the PAT Game according to Proposition 1.
A.7 Proof of Theorem 4
Consider a reformulation of the SWM Problem in (4) by
introducing the auxiliary received power vector z ∈ RK :
max
z,p
∑
k∈K
Uk(zk)− C(p),
s.t. zk = h
T
k p, ∀k ∈ K,
p ∈ P.
To prove Theorem 4, we will prove that optimal received
power vector z∗ is unique by contradiction (though the solution
(z∗,p∗) to the above optimization problem is not unique). We
then prove the uniqueness of the total tax for each agent at the
NEs.
A.7.1 Uniqueness of z∗
To prove the uniqueness of z∗, we suppose that there exist two
optimal solutions (z∗1,p
∗
1) and (z
∗
2,p
∗
2) such that z
∗
1 6= z∗2 (but
p∗1 may or may not be equal to p
∗
2). Due to the strict concavity of
Uk(zk) and the convexity of C(p), we have that
C
(
p∗1 + p
∗
2
2
)
≤ 1
2
(C(p∗1) + C(p
∗
2)),∑
k∈K
Uk
(
z∗1,k + z
∗
2,k
2
)
>
1
2
(∑
k∈K
Uk(z
∗
1,k) +
∑
k∈K
Uk(z
∗
2,k)
)
.
In addition, it is easy to verify that (z∗1/2 + z
∗
2/2,p
∗
1/2 + p
∗
2/2)
is also a feasible solution, which leads to an objective value of∑
k∈K
Uk
(
z∗1,k + z
∗
2,k
2
)
− C
(
p∗1 + p
∗
2
2
)
,
>
1
2
(∑
k∈K
Uk(z
∗
1,k) +
∑
k∈K
Uk(z
∗
2,k)
)
− 1
2
(C(p∗1) + C(p
∗
2)),
=v∗, (50)
where v∗ is the objective value achieved by optimal solution
(z∗1,p
∗
1) or (z
∗
2,p
∗
2). The above result contradicts to the fact that
(z∗1,p
∗
1) and (z
∗
2,p
∗
2) are optimal. Hence, we have proved the
uniqueness of the optimal received power vector z∗. This means
that all optimal solution leads to the same utility for each EU and
hence the same cost for the ET.
A.7.2 Uniqueness of each agent’s total tax
Next, we will prove the uniqueness of the total tax for each
agent at the NEs. The total tax for each EU k is∑
n
t∗k,n =
∑
n
∂Uk(qk(p
∗))
∂pn
p∗n =
∂Uk(z
∗
k)
∂zk
∑
n
hk,np
∗
n
=
∂Uk(z
∗
k)
∂zk
z∗k, (51)
which is unique due to the uniqueness of z∗k . The ET’s total tax∑
n t
∗
0,n is thus also unique. Therefore, we have proved that each
agent k ∈ K ∪ {0} receives the same payoff at every constrained
Lindahl allocation.
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A.8 Proof of Proposition 2
First, similar to Lemma 1 and (16) for the single-channel
system, it follows that the equilibrium transmit power vector p∗
must maximize every agent’s payoff. Otherwise, some agent can
change his power proposal to improve his payoff. Hence, the
sufficient and necessary conditions for the NEs of the MPAT Game
are given by: for every channel n ∈ N ,
1
K + 1
∑
l∈K∪{0}
γ∗l,n = p
∗
n, (52a)
∂Uk(qk(p
∗))
∂pn
− b∗ω(k+1),n + b∗ω(k+2),n = 0, k ∈ K, (52b)
−∂C(p
∗)
∂pn
− b∗1,n + b∗2,n − λ˜n − ν˜ + µ˜n = 0, (52c)
λ˜n(p
∗
n − Ppeak,n) = 0, (52d)
ν˜
(∑
m∈N
p∗m − Pmax
)
= 0, (52e)
µ˜np
∗
n ≥ 0, (52f)
µ˜n, p
∗
n, λ˜n, ν˜ ≥ 0, (52g)
where v˜ and {λ˜n} are the dual variables corresponding to the total
power constraint and peak power constraints for the ET’s payoff
maximization problem, respectively. Equation (52b) is EUs’ first
order conditions and (52c)-(52g) are the ET’s KKT conditions.
Combining (52b) and (52c), it follows that∑
k∈K
∂Uk(qk(p
∗))
∂pn
− ∂C(p
∗)
∂pn
− λ˜n + µ˜n = 0, ∀n ∈ N (53)
Additionally, (53) and (52d)-(52g) constitute the KKT conditions
for the SWM Problem in (37a)-(37g), indicating that the every NE
transmit power p∗ is exactly the socially optimal transmit power
po to the SWM Problem.
A.9 Proof of Proposition 3
Substituting 1K+1 (γk,n +
∑
l∈K∪{0} γ
∗
l,n) = p¯n and the tax
in (28) into the definition of NE, we obtain that
Jk (p¯, t¯k) ≤ Jk(p∗, t∗k), ∀p¯ ∈ RN , ∀k ∈ K ∪ {0}, (54)
where t¯k = {t¯k,n}n∈N and t¯k,n = R∗k,np¯n, for all n ∈ N and
all k ∈ K∪{0}. For an all-zero vector p¯ = 0, (54) further implies
that
Jk (0,0) ≤ Jk(p∗, t∗k), ∀k ∈ K ∪ {0}, (55)
which means that each agent k always weakly prefers to partic-
ipating in the MPAT Mechanism, independent of other agents’
strategies.
A.10 Proof of Theorem 5
To prove Theorem 5, we first present a reformulation of
the SWM Problem and its corresponding augmented Lagrangian
function. We then show that Algorithm 2 is an ADAL-based
algorithm that provably converges to the optimal solution of the
reformulated problem. We finally show that KKT conditions of
the reformulated problem are equivalent to the NE conditions of
the MPAT Game.
A.10.1 Problem Reformulation
We reformulate the SWM Problem by introducing auxiliary
variables pi = {pik}k∈K∪{0}, where pik = {pik,n}n∈N . They
will help decouple agents’ utility/cost functions in the following
reformulated problem:
(R− SWM−M) max
pi
∑
k∈K
Uk(qk(pik))− C(pi0) (56a)
s.t. pik = piω(k−1), ∀k ∈ K ∪ {0}, (56b)
pi0 ∈ P. (56c)
A.10.2 Lagrangian and Augmented Lagrangian
To show that Algorithm 2 is an ADAL-based algorithm, we
consider the augmented Lagrangian function of the R-SWM-M
Problem with the following decomposable structures [47]:
Lρ(pi,β) =
∑
k∈K∪{0}
Lρ,k(pik,β), (57)
where Lρ,k(pik,β) is the agent k’s local augmented Lagrangian
function, given by
Lρ,k(pik,β) =

Uk(qk(pik))−
∑
n∈N
[
pik,n
(
βk,n − βω(k+1),n
)
− ρ2
(
pik,n − piω(k−1),n
)2 ]
, if k ∈ K,
−C(pi0)−
∑
n∈N
[
pik,n
(
βk,n − βω(k+1),n
)
− ρ2
(
pik,n − piω(k−1),n
)2 ]
, if k = 0.
(58)
We observe that, if we let p = pik, γω(k−1) = piω(k−1), βk =
bω(k+1), and βω(k+1) = bω(k+2), then Lρ,k is the objective that
each agent k ∈ K∪{0} maximizes in (33). Therefore, Algorithm
2 is the ADAL-based method, as described in [47].
We then define the saddle point of Lρ as a tuple (pi∗,β∗)
that satisfies, for every pi ∈ Γ , {pi : pi0 ∈ P} and every
β ∈ R(K+1)N ,
Lρ(pi,β∗) ≤ Lρ(pi∗,β∗) ≤ Lρ(pi∗,β). (59)
A.10.3 KKT Conditions
The KKT conditions of the R-SWM-M Problem are given by:
for every channel n ∈ N ,
∂Uk(qk(pi
∗
k))
∂pik,n
− β∗k,n + β∗ω(k+1),n = 0, ∀k ∈ K,
(60a)
−∂C(pi
∗
0)
∂pi0,n
− β∗0,n + β∗1,n − λˆn − νˆ + µˆn = 0, (60b)
λˆ(pi0,n − Ppeak,n) = 0, (60c)
νˆ
(∑
m∈N
pi0,m − Pmax
)
= 0, (60d)
µˆnpi0,n = 0, (60e)
pik,n, µˆn, λˆn ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ K ∪ {0}.
(60f)
Let γk = pi
∗
k = p
o, for all k ∈ K ∪ {0}. We can show that
{γk}k∈K∪{0} satisfies (42a). In addition, substituting bω(k+1)
into β∗k, we have that (60a)-(60f) have exactly the same structure
as (42b)-(42f), which implies that mˆ = {(γk = pi∗k, bk =
β∗ω(k−1))}k∈K∪{0} satisfies the NE conditions in (52b)-(52g) and
thus is an NE.
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APPENDIX B
BENCHMARK: PRIVATE GOOD MECHANISM
In this section, we consider a standard benchmark mechanism
in [18, Chap. 11. C], to illustrate the inefficiency of private
provision of public goods. In this case, each EU only pays for
the transmit power that he requests. In other words, we treat the
transmit power as a private goods and ignore its non-rivalrous and
non-excludable public goods nature.
The private goods mechanism leads to a state of the economy
where
• EUs play a purchase game, where each EU k chooses his
power demand xk to maximize his payoff function (i.e.,
utility minus payment), considering a given market price
θ and transmit power requested by other EUs.
• The ET acts as a profit maximizer and chooses a supplied
transmit power p to maximize his profit (i.e., revenue
minus cost), given the market price θ.
• The market adjusts the market price θ such that the power
supply equals the power demand.
We characterize the equilibrium of the private goods mechanism
as follows:
Definition 2 (Benchmark Equilibrium (BE)). A BE is market
allocation specified by the equilibrium market price and the
equilibrium transmit power (p∗,θ∗) such that
x∗k(θ
∗,x∗−k) ∈ arg max
xk<0
Uk
qk
xk + ∑
j 6=k,j∈K
x∗j

− θ∗xk
]
, ∀k ∈ K (61)
p∗(θ∗) ∈ arg max
p∈P
[θ∗p− C(p)], (62)
where θ∗ is selected such that∑
k∈K
x∗k(θ
∗) = p∗(θ∗). (63)
The reason that we select the above BE is that if there are no
public goods effects (i.e., an EU k cannot benefit from another EU
j’s contribution xj), the BE becomes the well-known competitive
equilibrium. This can lead to a social optimum for a private goods
economy [18]. However, for the public goods economy, the BE can
be highly inefficient in general, i.e., far away from the maximum
social welfare that can be achieved.
To demonstrate its inefficiency and design an algorithm to
compute the BE, we conduct the following analysis:
• When there exists a p∗(θ∗) that is an interior point of P ,
we have
θ∗ = ∇pC(p∗) = max
k
∇pUk(qk(p∗)), (66)
where
max
k
∇pUk(qk(p))
,
(
max
k
∂Uk(qk(p))
∂p1
, ...,max
k
∂Uk(qk(p))
∂pN
)T
. (67)
Algorithm 3: Algorithm to Reach the BE
1 Initialize the iteration index τ ← 0. Each agent
k ∈ K ∪ {0} randomly initializes p(0) < 0. The ET
initializes the stopping criterion ;
2 Set conv flag← 0 # initialize the convergence flag;
3 while conv flag = 0 do
4 Each EU k computes the gradient of his utility function
with respect to the power ∇pUk(qk(p(t))) and sends
the value to the ET;
5 The ET computes the gradient of her utility function
with respect to the power ∇pC(p(t));
6 The ET computes p(t+ 1) by
p(t+ 1) = {p(t)
+α(t)
[
max
k
∇pUk(qk(p(t)))−∇pC(p(t))
]}
P
,
(64)
and broadcasts it to all EUs, where [·]P denotes the
projection onto the feasible convex set P ;
7 Set τ ← τ + 1;
8 if ||p(t+ 1)− p(t)||2 ≤ ||p(t)||2 then
9 conv flag← 1 ;
10 end
11 end
12 Compute the BE price vector θ∗ by
θ∗ = max
k
∇pUk(qk(p∗)). (65)
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Fig. 9. The CDF of the number of iterations for convergence with different
accuracy constants .
• From (66), we can see that, if K ≥ 2, the sum marginal
utility of all EUs is larger than the ET’s marginal cost at
the BE on each channel n, i.e.,19∑
k∈K
∇pUk(qk(p∗))  ∇pC(p∗). (68)
In other words, the optimal solution to the SWM Problem
(which would equalize the two terms in (68)) should be a
larger transmit power than the one at the BE.
Motivated by (66), we consider a projected subgradient-based
algorithm to compute the BE, as summarized in Algorithm 3.
We explain the key steps in the following. Each EU sends the
gradient of his utility to the ET (line 3). Then, the ET computes
the subgradient of her cost and updates the price vector according
19. For any two vectors a and b, a  b means that a is componentwisely
larger than b.
19
to (64). This direction of price update aims to equalize ∇pC(p)
and maxk∇pUk(p). The ET checks the termination criterion
(line 8). The termination happens if the absolute changes of the
power updates are small, determined by a positive constant  > 0.
Finally, the ET sets the BE price to EUs’ maximal marginal utility
on each channel, as in (65).
Although it is difficult to analytically prove Algorithm 3’s
convergence to a BE, we can numerically show its convergence,
as demonstrated in Fig. 9. Specifically, in Fig. 9, we show the
cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the number of iterations
for Algorithm 3 to converge, with different accuracy constants .
We show that Algorithm 3 always converges within 200 and 2,000
steps when  = 10−2 and 10−3, respectively.
APPENDIX C
EXTENSION TO THE SINGLE-EU MODEL
C.1 Extension to the Single-EU Model
In this section, we discuss how to extend our analysis to the
single-EU model.
Note that we cannot directly apply our previous PAT/MPAT
mechanisms where there is only one EU, since the tax rates defined
in (9) and (28) require at least three agents (i.e., at least two
EUs). Hence we need to perform some novel transformation of
the problem.
The key idea of such a transformation is to introduce a virtual
agent into the system. The virtual agent has an index 2 and
a zero utility U2 = 0. Define ({R∗k}k∈{0,1},po) as the con-
strained Lindahl allocation without the virtual agent, and define
({Rvk}k∈{0,1,2},pv) as the constrained Lindahl allocation with
the virtual agent. We can show the following equivalent results:
Proposition 4. For agents 0 and 1, the constrained Lindahl
allocations with and without the virtual agent are the same, i.e.,
({R∗k}k∈{0,1},po) = ({Rvk}k∈{0,1},pv).
Proof: Since the additional virtual agent’s utility is U2 =
0, the equilibrium transmit power po is also the optimal solution
to the SWM Problem in the system with the virtual agent. That
is, pv = p∗. Thus, R∗1 = ∇pUk(qk(p∗)) = ∇pUk(qk(pv)) =
Rv1 . Moreover, it is readily verified that R
v
2 = 0, which indicates
that
R∗0 = −R∗1 = −Rv1 −Rv2 = Rv0.
This completes the proof.
The intuition is that the virtual agent has a constant zero utility,
which does not change the optimal transmit power vector or the
Lindahl tax rates. Therefore, with the introduced virtual agent, we
can still use the PAT/MPAT mechanisms to achieve the constrained
Lindahl allocation and thus the socially optimal transmit power.
C.2 Extension to the Multi-ET Model
In the case of a multi-ET scenario where multiple ETs are
transmitting over orthogonal channels (as studied in (as studied in
[12]), our proposed mechanisms and the corresponding algorithms
can be easily extended to that case. Specifically, all ETs and all
EUs submit their messages described in (24) to a central ET.
Then, the central ET determines the transmit power and the taxes
according to (25)-(27). We can show that the proposed PAT/MPAT
Mechanisms and the corresponding PAT/MPAT Algorithms can
also achieve the properties (E1)-(E4).
In the case where ETs can potentially transmit over the
same channels, the problem becomes extremely challenging, since
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on the social welfare. Each result takes the average value of 1,000
experiments.
the SWM Problem becomes an energy beamforming problem
or a coordinated multi-point energy transmission problem with
distributed antennas. This makes the SWM problem non-convex,
which is challenging to solve even if the ETs have complete
information. We hence leave the multi-ET system for future work.
C.3 Extension to the Unknown K Model
To further extend our current model to the case where the
ET cannot know the total number of EUs, we can utilize the
mechanism design based on repeated games [40, Chap 2.3] to
exploit each EU’s local knowledge of the existence of his neighbor
EUs. Consider an undirected knowledge graph, where each node
corresponds to an agent; each edge implies that the nodes incident
to the edge know the existence of each other. Notice that such a
knowledge graph might correspond to, for example, the topology
of a wireless sensor network, since the transmitter and the receiver
in a sensor network need to know the existence of each other.
Starting from the current PAT Mechanism, we can further
propose a new mechanism that requires each EU to report his
participation decision to his neighbors. The new mechanism cor-
responds to a new game, which is a repeated game consisting
of infinitely many repetitions of the current game studied in our
paper. In this case, the EUs can play “trigger strategy” to punish
free-riding neighbors [40, Chap 2.3]. With a properly designed
punishment strategy, there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium,
where every EU would always choose to participate in the mech-
anism until he detects a free-riding neighbor and would send a
non-participation signal to the ET. Based on our current all-or-
none scheme, upon receiving any non-participation signal, the ET
would suspend transmitting wireless power to punish the free-
riders. This means that when taking into his neighbors’ trigger
strategies into account, no EU has the incentive to change from the
trigger strategy to a free-riding strategy of keeping silent. Hence,
assuming that each EU has at least one neighbor on the knowledge
graph, it is possible to eliminate free-riders by exploiting the
repeated interactions among the EUs. Such an assumption is much
weaker than the assumption of the ET’s complete knowledge of
the total number of EUs.
APPENDIX D
SUPPLEMENTARY SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we present supplementary simulation results.
We further study the impacts of the probability of channel avail-
ability and the channel diversity.
D.1 Impact of Channel Availability
Figs. 10 and 11 illustrate the impact of Prob, the probability
that one EU is available to harvest energy on a certain channel.
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Fig. 11. The impact of the probability of channel availability Prob on
the EUs’ average payoff. Each result takes the average value of 1,000
experiments.
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Fig. 12. Impact of cluster radius r on the EUs’ average payoff. Each
result takes the average value of 1,000 experiments.
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Fig. 13. Social welfare comparison with the PAT Mechanism and the
bidding mechanism in [26].
As shown in Fig. 10, for both schemes, the achievable social
welfare increases as Prob becomes larger, since EUs can benefit
more from the wireless power across different channels. Moreover,
the performance gain of the MPAT Mechanism compared with
the private goods mechanism also increases in Prob. Specifically,
when Prob = 1 and Pmax = 4 W, the performance improvement
is 160%. In Fig. 11, we observe a similar trend as in Fig. 10.
That is, the achievable EUs’ average payoff improvement of the
MPAT Mechanism compared with the private goods mechanism
also increases as Prob increases.
D.2 Impact of Channel Diversity
We study the impact of channel diversity on the EUs’ average
payoff. As shown in Fig. 12, EUs’ average payoff decreases
as r increases. Moreover, the EUs’ average payoff gain of the
MPAT Mechanism compared with the private goods mechanism
decreases in r. This also shows that the performance in terms of
the EUs’ average payoff improvement of the MPAT Mechanism is
also most significant when EUs have comparable channel gains.
D.3 Comparison with Bidding Mechanism in [26]
We compare the proposed PAT Mechanism with the bidding
mechanism proposed in [26], we set r = 5m and CF1 = 915
MHz. In Fig. 13, we can see that the social welfare of both
schemes increases in the number of EUs K . Moreover, when K
becomes larger, the performance gap between Pmax = 1W and
Pmax = 4W also becomes larger for the PAT Mechanism. On the
other hand, the maximum power constraint has almost no impact
on the bidding mechanism. This is because as K becomes larger,
a larger Pmax can allow a larger transmit power that provides
more benefits to more EUs in the PAT Mechanism. However, the
bidding mechanism would incentivize the free-riders due to the
similar reason under the benchmark mechanism. Hence, only one
EU with the largest marginal utility will purchase power, and a
larger K does not significantly increase the demand.
